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Realizing the Kennedy Vision: The John 
F. Kennedy Institute, Paradiplomacy, 
and Dutch Foreign Relations, 
1960s–1980s
Giles Scott-Smith
The University of  Leiden, The Netherlands
this article examines the role of the John F. Kennedy institute as a 
“paradiplomatic actor” during detente. inspired by Kennedy’s vision for a 
transformation of both transatlantic and West–East relations, the institute 
sought to contribute to a Europe-wide peace system through contacts with 
counterparts in Poland, hungary and Yugoslavia. relations with the dutch 
Foreign Ministry were close, despite the fact that the ministry’s contacts with 
these central European regimes were limited.
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Introduction
The literature on the contribution of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to trans-
national relations, and how they have impacted international history, international rela-
tions and diplomacy, is now well established. NGOs are recognised as significant actors 
for cultural and political transfer, the diffusion of ideas and the establishment of norms.1 
In the cold war context, NGOs as transnational actors became significant from the late 
1950s as advocates for peace, from the 1970s through their demand for human rights 
within the frame of East–West relations and for pushing issues such as environmental 
protection that moved beyond the cold war dynamic.2 The 1970s is regarded as the 
pivotal decade for this transnational turn, due to the early seminal research in IR and 
the level of interdependence across the security, political, economic, environmental and 
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sociocultural fields.3 Looking back from the year 2000, Charles Maier could claim that 
twentieth century history was marked by the decline of territoriality as the framing 
device for our understanding of power and identity, and that this trend was particularly 
noticeable from the 1970s onwards.4
With this transnational turn in mind, this article picks up on Robert Brier’s call for 
“broadening the cultural history of the Cold War” by illustrating the importance of a 
non-state actor involved in both West–West and West–East relations.5 In September 1966, 
the John F. Kennedy Institute/Center for Atlantic Studies (JFK) opened at the University 
of Tilburg in the Netherlands. Seeking to contribute to a nascent transcontinental peace 
system, its lifespan ranged from the early years of Détente in the mid-60s to the late cold 
war in the mid-80s. The JFK Institute is analysed here as a micro-level focus point for var-
ious trends in international relations at that time. Firstly, it represented the mobilisation 
of private interests to play a high-level role in the increasingly interdependent East–West 
international environment, engaging with counterparts who – from the perspective of 
Dutch foreign relations – were previously considered unworthy of dialogue. Secondly – 
in contrast to the transnational peace and social movements that have drawn the most 
research interest6 – it sought to leverage the political and social capital that it possessed 
through its knowledge-based elite networks, in order to claim legitimacy as an actor in the 
cold war theatre. Thirdly, it was a product of the Détente period, in that the conditions 
for East–West contacts were radically transformed through the step-by-step processes 
of mutual recognition. Fourthly, it was motivated by shifting power relations within 
the West itself, notably the threat of centrifugal forces weakening the Atlantic alliance, 
and the development of a European Community learning to speak with one voice as an 
international actor.7 Lastly, it was part of a counter-trend to Western demoralisation 
and fragmentation. As Jan-Werner Müller has claimed, “the mid-1970s seem like the 
high point of what one might call the crisis of the West – or at least the high point of an 
acute consciousness of crisis in the West.”8
The importance of NGOs for the creation of a (previously non-existent) space for 
political dialogue is crucial here. They possess the means, contacts and issues to achieve 
this outside of the bounds of formal diplomatic practice, relatively autonomous from 
governmental oversight. In this respect one can refer to a form of paradiplomacy con-
ducted by “policy entrepreneurs” or “politico-intellectuals” who promulgated their own 
political visions and blueprints for change in support of, alongside, or separate from 
the inter-governmental arena.9 The JFK Institute benefitted from its status as a private 
institution, positioning itself outside of the realm of diplomatic officialdom in order to 
facilitate more open dialogue, yet also flexible (and credible) enough to assume the stature 
of a semi-official diplomatic player, pursuing a rolling series of discussions that sought 
to ease tensions and build a trans-European rapport towards peace.10
Significance of a Small NGO in a Small State
The official history of Tilburg University outlines the JFK’s purpose thus:
The John F. Kennedy Institute is an interdisciplinary institute that aims to contribute to the 
study of relations between the nations in the Atlantic region and the respective attitudes and 
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importance of these nations in relation to the development of more peaceful international 
relations.11
The Institute took its inspiration from the realisation that a relaxation of tensions 
between the West and the Soviet bloc would have profound consequences for relations 
within the West itself. This not only referred to the apparent general threat of a loosening 
of bonds between the USA and Western Europe under conditions of Detente, but also to 
the possibility that a greater room for manoeuvre was opening up for individual states 
to find their own modus operandi in East–West relations. The hoped-for benefits from 
reduced tensions could also weaken the Western alliance. In 1966, the same year the JFK 
Institute opened, the alliance had faced a serious test with the withdrawal of France 
from NATO’s centralised military command. It was anticipated that other changes to 
the configuration of the West would follow.
For these reasons, the Institute operated on two fronts. Firstly, it sought to strengthen 
contacts with the USA, making use of existing public diplomacy channels and initiating 
new ones to ensure a constant transatlantic scholarly interchange of ideas and individuals. 
It became the recipient of visiting Fulbright scholars, and worked closely with NATO on 
problem-solving projects related to difficulties within the alliance. Secondly, from 1969 
onwards it became an active player in East–West relations, seeking out contacts with 
foreign policy think tanks and institutes across Eastern Europe, and in so doing initiating 
a dialogue on common security concerns. This was carried through most successfully 
in Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and it increasingly involved participants from the 
Dutch government as part of its “network of specialists”.12
Diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the Soviet bloc in the cold war 
were stilted due to the Dutch government’s refusal to grant legitimacy to the “peoples’ 
democracies” in the east.13 This continued during the 1970s, when the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the subsequent Helsinki Accords were used by 
The Hague to push an agenda promoting human rights and civic freedoms. East–West 
trade relations – in contrast to West Germany or Britain – were never seen by the Dutch 
as holding great potential, removing another possible incentive for relaxing relations.14 
Yet relations between the Institute and the foreign ministry were always close. A mem-
ber of the ministry always sat on the JFK’s board, and from 1976 to 1984 JFK director 
Frans Alting von Geusau served as chair of the Advisory Committee on Disarmament 
and International Security. In the Dutch diplomatic context, therefore, the JFK was used 
informally as a form of non-governmental outreach for contacts with “the other side”. 
This could be accepted because Alting von Geusau, a member of the Catholic upper 
establishment, possessed the connections to “legitimise” his activities. So whereas its 
official input was minimal, this should not exclude the possibility that, for NGOs of this 
kind, “their indirect influence was possibly greater”.15
Origins and purpose
Alting von Geusau was a graduate in law from Leiden University who was made Professor 
of International Law at the Catholic University Brabant (later the University of Tilburg) 
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in 1965. He had also studied under Henri Brugmans at the Europa College in Bruges, 
following which, during 1959–60, he had worked closely with Ernst B. Haass at the 
University of California in Berkeley. Von Geusau names Brugmans among his most impor-
tant intellectual influences, along with Leiden international law professor Frederick van 
Asbeck.16 From these formative years he took two clear positions into his professional 
work: a focus on the contribution that international organisations could make to end the 
“absurd artificial” division of Europe and create a viable post-Second World War peace 
system; and a determination that international law could establish norms of behaviour 
that would mollify inter-state antagonisms. There was also the influence of President 
Kennedy himself, an influence that went beyond the institute’s title. In a paper on East–
West relations from April 1968, for instance, Alting von Geusau drew on Kennedy’s 
speech at American University on 11 June 1963 for inspiration. The Dutchman called for 
moving beyond the simplistic communist/anti-communist division of the world through 
“an acceptance of the world of diversity in the 60s”. To achieve peace meant “not the 
victory of one system of government but the organization of coexistence and mutual 
acceptance between several systems of government”.17
The initial move for the JFK was purely academic, but that would soon change in a 
policy-relevant direction. Alting von Geusau was convinced that there were serious defi-
ciencies in the theory and practice of political studies in Western Europe, when compared 
to the “new experiments and adaptations in study programmes” in the USA. Coupled 
with this was his conviction that the Atlantic region, with its dense networks and layers of 
diplomatic, economic, financial, military and cultural interchange, required specific inves-
tigative attention. Having completed his PhD in 1962 on “European Organisations and 
the Foreign Relations of States,” he criticised how the study of International Relations 
in Europe was focused on problems related to European integration. As a result, “a sys-
tematic study of problems in their Atlantic context is therefore lacking”. Since “Atlantic 
problems” necessarily required an interdisciplinary approach involving “at least the fac-
ulties of law, economics, the social sciences, and the arts (including political and histor-
ical science)”, the best solution was to run such a set-up from an independent institute 
unburdened by faculty boundaries – a distinctly American-style solution.18
The impetus for the Institute fell within a wider promotion of Atlantic studies in 
Western Europe that had been going on since the early 1960s. The Ford Foundation in 
particular, prominent in funding and expanding American Studies programmes via the 
American Council of Learned Societies from 1960 onwards, had aimed to establish a 
series of institutes across the continent that could give “transatlanticism” a permanent 
foothold within European academia. Focusing on the main centres of power, the Ford 
did not back a similar institute in the Netherlands.19 Instead, local elites set about estab-
lishing such a location themselves. With Dutch security policy built entirely around a 
functioning Atlantic alliance, there was a strong feeling that “the Netherlands … offers 
the best political climate in Western Europe for establishing this institute.”20
By the late 1960s, however, the motives were somewhat different than earlier in the 
decade. President Kennedy’s call for transatlantic interdependence and the Grand Design 
of ever-closer partnership between North America and Western Europe had set the tone 
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for initiatives in the early 1960s, but this had been followed by a series of disappoint-
ments, not least the failure of the EEC to maintain momentum in the face of a resurgent 
nationalism and protectionism.21 By 1967, so the backers of the JFK Institute felt, there 
was a need to revive the Kennedy vision and once again place “the Atlantic area” at the 
centre of international relations. Moreover, adopting a strong supranationalist tone, it 
declared that “the obsolescence of the sovereign nation state, especially in Europe, is 
such that its continued existence increasingly endangers international peace”.22 There is 
no question that John F. Kennedy’s rejuvenating vision inspired the Dutch protagonists. 
The very naming of the institution to pursue this Atlanticist agenda after him was a bold 
move to both capitalise on and resuscitate the late President’s ideals. Alting von Geusau 
himself became the first director of a short-lived attempt to establish a Dutch “peace 
corps” in honour of its American progenitor’s worldview.
Yet the circumstances for attempting such a revival were not opportune, as illustrated 
by the Ford Foundation-funded Committee on Atlantic Studies (CAS). Established in 1964 
jointly by the Atlantic Institute in Paris and the Atlantic Council in the USA under the 
leadership of Eugene Rostow at Yale, its goal was “to encourage teaching and research 
focused on the political, economic and social relationships of the nations in the Atlantic 
world”. This was the high point of the Ford Foundation’s support for Atlanticist initia-
tives, pushing the development of policy-relevant studies and new forms of governance 
for the transatlantic region, and the initial development of the CAS looked promising. In 
1966 a European chapter was created and the first US-European conference was held at 
the Villa Serbelloni in September 1967, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Alting 
von Geusau joined the following year, becoming chair of the European section. A new 
charter was drafted that sought to strengthen inter-university cooperation and encourage 
the study of “our common civilization and its links and responsibilities to others”.23 A 
Five-Year Program was drawn up in early 1968 with a total budget of $954,000, including 
proposals for research projects on student unrest, regional security and free trade areas, 
as well as an annual report on transatlantic affairs. The potential for CAS to become a 
transatlantic research arm of the Atlantic Institute and clarify the “integrative trend” in 
the region was noted, and some projects – Nils Andren’s proposed study of the treatment 
of Europe and North America in their respective textbooks, and how this linked to atti-
tudes, in particular – were seen to have real promise. But in 1969 the Ford Foundation, 
prepared to support the preparatory conferences but not the research agenda, withdrew 
its support on the grounds that it “continues to flounder about in search of a role”.24 
It was impossible for the CAS to convince other potential funders of its relevance, the 
Atlantic Institute was unable to build on it and Alting von Geusau resigned due to the 
lack of support.
The CAS episode illustrated how by the late 1960s it was difficult to obtain finan-
cial support for transatlantic-focused topics. The transformation of East-West and 
North–South relations were altering the context in which the transatlantic was being 
viewed, and new challenges (pollution, energy, environmental decline and health) were 
appearing. The Atlantic Institute would soon be discussing whether to change its name, 
and the Bilderberg meetings debated whether to admit Japanese members (they didn’t, 
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which partly fuelled the formation of the Trilateral Commission).25 Alting von Geusau 
himself admitted that there were “very limited possibilities in Europe” for funding the 
JFK.26 Within the Netherlands itself, deliberate moves were made to ensure a broad base 
of support. The appointment of Ernst van der Beugel, the European Secretary of the 
Bilderberg meetings, as Professor in Atlantic Cooperation at Leiden University in 1966 
was a bonus. Van der Beugel, a died-in-the-wool Atlanticist (in the sense of supporting US 
leadership of the Atlantic alliance), joined prominent Dutch Europeanists on the JFK’s 
research board: Jean Monnet’s confident Max Kohnstamm (also a member of CAS), 
Jan Kymmell of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former rector of the College de 
l’Europe, Henri Brugmans. The governance structure therefore reflected a cross-section 
of opinions on US–European relations, and this was further extended through contacts 
with Clarence Streit’s federalist Atlantic Union Committee. This indicates how the JFK 
Institute attempted to unite the pro-Atlanticist factions, of whatever stripe, as a solid 
foundation for its future endeavours.
The start-up period was wholly Atlantic in orientation. Looking to pursue a high-
level research agenda, Alting von Geusau had already arranged a grant in 1965 from the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the role of international organizations 
in the implementation of treaties. The Endowment’s office in Geneva ran a permanent 
study group on international institutions, which provided a perfect meeting ground for 
him to link up with a trans-European network of scholars which he could later tap into. 
In November 1966 Kohnstamm – also a valuable conduit to possible funds from the 
Ford Foundation – secured a further grant of 25,000 Dutch Guilders from the Institut 
de la Communauté Européenne pour les Ėtudes Universitaires, created in 1957 by Jean 
Monnet in Lausanne to stimulate the development of university courses devoted to the 
construction of Europe. From this, the JFK Institute held the first in a series of “collo-
quia on current Atlantic problems”: Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing in NATO 
as a Problem for Dutch Foreign Policy.27 It was through this colloquium that Alting von 
Geusau came into contact with the transatlantic network he considers to be the most 
important for his professional activities: The Institute of Strategic Studies in London.28 
Similar colloquia would follow between 1967–69 on the Kennedy Round, the future 
of NATO, international monetary governance, and security in the 1970s. The aim was 
always to provide a space for the mixing of theoretical and practical approaches and 
academic and policy-making circles, thereby building “a more policy-attuned environ-
ment.”29 The “disarray in the Atlantic world” required exactly “more policy-oriented 
research at the universities on the one hand, and for more scientifically based foreign 
policies on the other.”30
However, the ambitions for the Institute soon departed from what it could realistically 
achieve. The policy-relevant topics chosen for study were too broad, beyond the capacity 
of a small institute lacking a financial patron of sufficient stature. A panel of experts 
(including van der Beugel, Kymmell, Kohnstamm, and Brugmans) wanted the JFK to look 
at “problems of intergovernmental and non-governmental cooperation in the Atlantic 
area”, and had encouraged the Institute to “be willing to undertake specific studies at 
the request of governments, international organizations and other non-governmental 
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bodies.”31 This did not provide enough guidance, and the resulting collage of projects 
and events showed instead that the central goals of the Institute were still unclear. The 
JFK was ultimately suffering from the same problems as the CAS – in which direction 
should Atlantic-orientated research actually go? What should be the goals? It is indicative 
that, despite several attempts during 1966–71, the JFK was never able to attract Ford 
Foundation support for its projects. Despite Kohnstamm’s close relations with the Ford 
and Alting von Geusau being director of “the only Institute for Atlantic Studies on the 
Continent”, the Foundation was never fully convinced of the coherence of the submitted 
proposals.32 Funding would always remain predominantly Dutch.33
Finding a mission? Turning to the East
The influence of John F. Kennedy on this Dutch Institute stretched beyond a deepening 
of transatlantic relations. At American University in June 1963, Kennedy had laid out 
three principal goals: the pursuit of peace, redefining relations with the Soviet Union, and 
re-examining the basis of the cold war. “Let us focus instead on a more practical, more 
attainable peace”, Kennedy said, “based not on a sudden revolution in human nature 
but on a gradual evolution in human institutions”.34 Looking to contribute to this side 
to the Kennedy legacy, in 1967 Alting von Geusau initiated a PhD project on the con-
trasting roles of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in disarmament negotiations and détente, 
and the Institute’s second report from April 1967 stated that it “should focus on projects 
concerning the interrelationship between issues dealt with in an Atlantic context and 
world issues and East-West contacts”. A new project covering the importance of cultural 
relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact member states was now being prepared by 
JFK research scholar Lazslo Bartalits, a refugee from Hungary in 1956, which would 
examine “the function of cultural policies in relations between East and West [and] their 
impact on general political relations.”35 In particular, the central question was “how far 
cultural relations, which emerge out of a specific political context, can develop separately 
and eventually lead to a progressive relaxation in political relations”.36 Bartalits began 
by assembling an inventory of cultural exchange programs between NATO and Warsaw 
Pact member states, plotting “their evolution, scope and intensity” to trace their role in 
influencing the processes of détente. His preliminary study in 1969 outlined how cultural 
exchanges could produce positive political effects such as a reduction in hostility, but 
they could also be used for propagandising, enhancing national prestige or gathering 
intelligence. The study pointed out how East European interest in East–West exchanges 
through the 1960s indicated “an increasing tension between the requirements of increased 
international communication and the inability to cope with it on the basis of ideological 
and political premises”.37 Bartalits had provided a blueprint for the JFK’s new direction.
The first contacts between Tilburg and the Eastern bloc occurred in 1967 when a group 
of faculty and students from the Economics department went to Moscow, followed by 
a trip to Prague in April the following year. Alting von Geusau visited the Institute for 
International Political and Economic Relations in the Sociological Institute of Prague 
in July 1968 to discuss the possibility of a conference on International Organisation 
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and the Changing European System. The proposal, radical in outlook, was to link up 
with partners such as the Pugwash Committee on European Security and the Council 
of Europe’s East–West Study Group for a discussion on alternative orders for Europe, 
effectively looking beyond NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, it was the Warsaw Pact 
itself that put an end to this proposal with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
1968, and contacts were never renewed.38
More structural contacts began in 1970, when Alting von Geusau was approached 
by the Polish embassy in The Hague with an offer to bring him into contact with the 
Polish Institute of International Affairs (PIIA) in Warsaw. An agreement was signed in 
September 1970, and the first “round table conference” was held in Warsaw in January 
1971. Alting von Geusau led a mixed Dutch delegation consisting of journalist Jerome 
Heldring, Catholic Party MP Jozef Mommersteeg, Labour Party MP Max van der Stoel, 
Director of the Peace Research Institute Hendrik Neuman and Leo Kraland, a member of 
the East–West Trade Commission of the Netherlands Wholesale Association. This was 
soon followed, thanks to contacts via Bartalits, by a round table conference in Budapest 
in June 1971, with van der Stoel, Neuman, Kraland, and Heldring joined this time by 
Rudolph Jurrjens of the Foundation for the Promotion of East–West Contacts, L. Jaquet 
of the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and Professor Bosman from 
the Dutch Social and Economic Council. Yugoslavia followed a year later, via contacts at 
the University of Zagreb made by Jaquet at an International Institute for Strategic Studies 
conference in Stresa.39 These colloquia would continue with all three nations through 
the 1970s, ending in 1980 (Poland), 1985 (Hungary) and 1987 (Yugoslavia), respectively. 
Heldring (who also represented the NIIA) and Neuman were Alting von Geusau’s main 
institutional partners in these ventures. Similar contacts had been established by British 
and French institutions, but these were the first organised contacts at think-tank level 
run by a Dutch non-governmental organisation. Alting von Geusau’s status in the Dutch 
social elite enabled him to occupy this “diplomatic space” without opposition from the 
institutions of the state. Van der Stoel, Dutch Foreign Minister from 1973 to 77, was 
the most important politician taking part, and he went on to become a major voice in 
the cause for human rights in Europe. The JFK seminars were a useful briefing for the 
ministerial post.40
The East–West colloquia: Novel terrain
The attitude of the Dutch government towards a European Security Conference, a goal 
of the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s, was highly sceptical. There was no accept-
ance of the USSR as a trustworthy partner in international diplomacy, and certainly no 
desire to grant the communist regime in Moscow any greater legitimacy by means of 
a large-scale meeting between heads of state, the only substance of which would be its 
propaganda value. If the Soviet Union wanted such a conference so badly then it had 
to be prepared to offer concessions to the West, and these focused mainly on the issues 
of human rights and freedom of movement.41 The Dutch view was therefore that any 
such conference should only be used to loosen Soviet control over Eastern Europe – an 
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approach that put The Hague at odds with Washington, since presidents Nixon and 
Ford were more interested in establishing stable relations with Moscow.42 What is more, 
it was exactly the smaller European nations, unable to indulge in power politics, which 
were keen to push this agenda more than the larger powers.43 In these circumstances the 
JFK, in pursuing the Kennedy vision of moving beyond the cold war, was “out of line” 
with Dutch foreign policy.
An interesting factor here is to what extent these colloquia were meetings of equals, 
operating on the same terrain. Different versions of “civil society” were here in contact, 
and the JFK’s counterparts were careful to express the agreed-upon line of the respective 
regime. Alting von Geusau has spoken of how in Poland “you could see clearly that in 
order to survive you needed to be two persons – you have the official opinion, and you 
have your own”. Reaching the private behind the public obviously required some careful 
manoeuvring. The Dutchman’s speeches (the content of which he insisted on keeping 
the same for any audience, be it Western or Eastern) invariably elicited criticisms from 
“secret service types”, but after the event “people were lining up to ask me questions, 
people wanted ‘to go for a walk’”. He reported at the time that “even among the so-called 
‘new class’ [younger technocrats] there were evident political tensions under the surface. 
Anti-Russian and Anti-East German sentiments strongly present.”44 Religion provided 
another bridge, particularly in Poland:
They insisted on showing me beautiful churches. In the church they were Catholic [as was 
Alting von Geusau himself], and in the institute they were communist. It was very much the 
system, they were two persons. The only way to encounter the second person was to be very 
straightforward in public and very open for private discussions thereafter.45
Yet plenty of care had to be taken, since Poland in the 1970s was not an easy environment 
to operate in. Aside from genuine efforts to make contact and establish dialogue, regular 
attempts at blackmail were also part of the game, and all rooms were clearly bugged. 
Alting von Geusau always ensured that he reported in with the Dutch Embassy when 
he arrived so as to provide some diplomatic protection, and made sure to play all of his 
visits out in the open. Yet surveillance was not confined to the East, since he was also 
convinced that his activities were being monitored (by being followed and by telephone 
taps) by the Dutch security service (BVD) in the Netherlands. A meeting with the BVD 
brought this out into the open, but it also brought a request that he might propose certain 
questions and act as a channel of information on the state of thinking within the Eastern 
bloc. Alting von Geusau refused – he would not compromise himself (or the non-state 
identity of the JFK) by getting involved with “specific requests” for intelligence purposes. 
Nevertheless, the image this gives of “politico-intellectual” free enterprise being kept 
under surveillance and – potentially – undermined by sections of the state in both West 
and East is revealing. For state authorities, transnational civil contacts represented both 
opportunity and threat in 1970s Europe.
Alting von Geusau described these colloquia as “very much part of the détente 
approach – try to establish as many contacts as possible, to understand each other, but 
also to exercise some informal influence”.46 He has also referred to these meetings as 
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being used “in later years as a cover for less official contacts with dissidents”, although 
that remains unsubstantiated.47 Fixed arrangements were agreed with the Poles, allowing 
exchanges of three or four postgraduate students for a month of study. Alting von Geusau 
insisted on complete freedom for the research topics, and each person was limited to one 
visit only. As might be expected, there were more candidates wanting to go West than 
go East, but some of those who did go East made good use of the opportunity, such as 
Arie Bloed.48 There was an awareness that these exchanges could in a small way add 
to the centrifugal forces pulling Eastern Europe away from the Soviet Union over the 
longer term.49 However, following the Helsinki Accords in August 1975 NATO agreed 
on the “margin of tolerance” approach, which looked to expose differences of opinion 
between the Eastern European regimes and Moscow.50 Ironically, this repoliticisation of 
East–West relations along the lines of human rights meant the JFK’s activities became 
more difficult following Helsinki.
There were clear differences in how the Eastern bloc nations responded to these con-
tacts. The Yugoslavs, represented by the Institute of International Politics and Economics 
in Belgrade, were the most open, as was to be expected considering the determina-
tion of that nation to chart its own course between East and West. In contrast to the 
semi-non-governmental nature of the Yugoslav partners, the Poles and the Hungarians 
organised their participation via their foreign ministries, and while the Hungarians made 
use of the contacts as a means to give experience to younger officials, the Poles remained 
the “hardliners”, determined to control the whole process. From the Polish perspective, 
the autonomous status of the JFK was awkward because they wanted an “official del-
egation”. George Embree, an American journalist who worked on the colloquia at the 
JFK during the mid-70s, compared this approach with the “nonchalant” Yugoslavs.51 Yet 
what is more evident, as the report on the first meeting with the Yugoslavs demonstrates, 
was a clash in perspectives between the well-meaning West and the sober East.
During the conference the difference between the delegations in how international relations 
are evaluated was clearly visible. Dutch idealism was confronted with Yugoslav pragmatism, 
for which Mr. Mates [member of the Yugoslav Institute] was the principal spokesperson. 
He proposed that the Soviet Union needed to be spoken to from a position of strength, and 
the West needed to adjust to what was practically achievable in the proposed Conference on 
European Security.52
This comment was illustrated more in the report on the discussion, where Mates empha-
sised that “‘freer movement’ … should be handled more as a tactical negotiation point. 
He recommended that the Netherlands aim for the maximum possible, ‘but not to push 
too hard’”. Overall, the Dutch position that “following a European détente there would 
be an osmosis of East and West” was received with scepticism by their discussion part-
ners.53 Significantly, at the second roundtable in The Hague in March 1976, following 
the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the realism of the Yugoslavs was in the ascendant. 
For the Dutch, hopes for more pressure being put on Moscow had not been realised, 
and the event had instead been used to strengthen the blocs and heighten the ideological 
contest between them. For the Yugoslavs the only way forward was to view Helsinki as a 
34   GileS SCott-SMith
step towards further relaxation of tensions and increased cooperation between East and 
West, and not – as the Soviet Union wanted – as a confirmation of superpower hegem-
ony. Against the sober Dutch, the Yugoslavs were now the optimists, claiming that the 
space was now opening up for nations such as the Netherlands and Yugoslavia to take a 
leading role in making the Helsinki process work towards a less divided Europe, taking 
it away from superpower control.54
What were the motives of the Eastern European nations? Here a distinction needs 
to be made between the Yugoslavs on one side and the Poles on the other, with the 
Hungarians somewhere in between. For the Yugoslavs these kinds of civil contacts were 
a further confirmation of their independent role in Europe in particular and in the world 
in general. Non-alignment required that they enter into dialogue with all parties, avoiding 
being incorporated into any system that would restrict political manoeuverability. For the 
Poles the set-up was very different. Contacts had already existed between the PIIA and 
Jaquet at the Dutch Institute, but these were cut off in 1969 due to Jaquet’s objection to 
the Polish regime’s anti-Semitism at that time. Concerned that the link would be lost, 
Jaquet put forward Alting von Geusau as an alternative partner, and Alting von Geusau, 
looking at Poland, felt that maintaining the relation “could only do them some good”.55
Yet the Polish participants were not passive subjects of a Western initiative – instead 
they saw it as an opportunity to convey their own message to the West. Alting von 
Geusau did not realise it at the time, but he later understood that the official Polish stake 
in the affair was “to build up contacts to defend themselves”.56 Cooperation with the 
JFK was therefore another small contributing factor to legitimising the regime during 
a difficult period. That this trade-off was not immediately apparent to the Dutch gives 
an interesting insight into the idealism that lay behind this entire venture into paradi-
plomacy. Of the three participating countries in the East, it was the Poles who pushed 
the socialist world view most strongly. At the Round table conference in The Hague in 
1977, a strong message was delivered by the Polish delegation that human rights meant 
as much “social justice” as it did “individual freedom”, and that the Western emphasis 
on human rights was nothing more than “an organised campaign against détente”.57 It 
was the West, in other words, that was disrupting the chance for peace offered by the 
Helsinki agreements, a stance that was completely in line with similar Soviet positions 
propagated since the late 1940s.
Similar standpoints were laid out at the Dutch-Polish Seminar on Arms Control held 
in Warsaw in March 1980. The discussions were “extraordinarily honest” and the posi-
tions of the two delegations “directly opposed each other”. For the Dutch, the causes of 
worsening East–West relations were Soviet rearmament (the deployment of the SS-20) 
and the invasion of Afghanistan; for the Poles, it was the NATO drive for superiority 
(the Dual-Track decision of December 1979) and the US reactions to Afghanistan. The 
Poles used the opportunity to try and gain Dutch support for a European Disarmament 
Conference focused on conventional weapons and not involving the United States. The 
background to this seminar illustrates the hardening of the Polish position through 
1979–80. Originally planned through PISM, the regular partner, the seminar was first 
blocked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then effectively controlled by ministry 
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officials.58 The Polish authorities always saw these meetings as something they should do 
to avoid isolation, and as an opportunity to bring the Dutch round to their standpoint. 
These were not one-way affairs. Alting von Geusau’s ‘two Polands’ notwithstanding, the 
colloquia indicated that ‘peaceful coexistence’ for the Polish participants did involve a 
genuine contest of ideologies.
Conclusion
Alting von Geusau is most notorious in the Netherlands not for his work with the JFK, 
but for a speech he gave in September 1981 at the instigation of the Atlantic Commission 
that questioned the links between Moscow and the peace movement.59 This (often mis-
quoted) speech cemented his reputation as a Cold Warrior, and it is true that during the 
1980s he did engage with right-wing anti-communist networks such as Le Cercle. Yet it 
would be a mistake to typecast him purely in those terms. His networks were extensive, 
resting in particular on the Carnegie Endowment in Geneva, the ISS in London, and 
the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Top-level contacts in the USA led him to 
several visiting professorships at Harvard and being called to the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs to discuss the CSCE in 1972. The JFK Institute – which closed its doors in 
1987 – sought to implement the Kennedy vision with an expansive East–West approach 
to transatlantic relations unique in Dutch foreign affairs. In doing so the Institute was 
not simply tolerated by but served a purpose for Dutch diplomacy, however diffuse and 
unrecorded that may have been. The JFK attempted to move with the times of détente in 
a different way than the ministry. In a recent study on cultural diplomacy (which includes 
essays written mainly in the late 1980s and early 1990s), Alting von Geusau concluded:
Cultural contacts with the West did not produce political change in the East, nor did they 
cause the revolution from below in the East. But they certainly helped revolutionize the closed 
societies by exposing the abnormality of isolation.60
Some have pointed to the impact of transnational alliances of experts on the transforma-
tion of security policy thinking from the 1950s onwards, reaching its culmination under 
Gorbachev in the 1980s.61 Yet as the example of the JFK shows, there is no need to insist 
that NGOs were present at the top table in order to claim their historical relevance. To 
place the Institute requires a broader understanding of cross-border interactions and the 
international policy-making environment itself, one that “flattens out” the distinction 
between government and non-government and addresses the relative fluidity of inter-
national affairs and international identities. In doing so, a more complex, multi-layered 
picture of Benelux “diplomacy” in the cold war can emerge.
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